China’s economy has seen plenty of headwinds recently – weak exports, slower growth in services and manufacturing, and a weak recovery of corporate earnings, in spite of rapid credit growth.
China’s equity markets have performed weakly too, and have been extremely volatile. But much of the recent volatility has less to do with sagging growth and much more to do with a cash crunch and tight liquidity in China’s banking system. What is going on?
These developments are taking place amid major reform efforts in China’s capital markets. There is now stronger demand for wealth management and savings and trust products in China.
As a result, the actions of central government authorities should be seen not merely as a response to an uptick in credit growth but as steps toward reshaping its entire financial system, liberalising its currency and creating international financial markets, centred around Shanghai.
China’s cash crunch, which began in mid-June, came just before its three-day Dragonboat holiday – public holidays are typically times of high demand for cash. At the same time, banks were scheduled for regulatory review, and as such, typically require cash to close their quarter-end books.
The Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate (Shibor) started to rise due to these high interbank borrowing demands. This has happened in the past toward the quarter-end and, typically, the central bank has stepped in to help ease banking system liquidity and thus lower the Shibor rate.
What surprised the market this time was that China’s central bank held back from pumping cash into the market. Instead, it allowed the Shibor to soar, at one point reaching as high as 13 per cent.
Expectations that the interbank interest rate hike might lead to widespread default among the system’s weaker banks – sparking a banking crisis – led to severe selling activity in the equity markets of China and Hong Kong.
Some analysts claimed that this crisis was “self-created” by the central bank. True, the Chinese central bank can very easily defuse the crisis by injecting liquidity into the system. But the fact that the central bank did not intervene also sent a strong signal to the banks – they need to source their own liquidity and shed the assumption, particularly held by the country’s smaller banks, that interbank interest rates will remain constantly low and liquidity typically abundant.
China’s banks should also not rely too heavily on low-cost interbank borrowing as their funding source to issue a variety of wealth-management products. Banks need to own up to the consequences of a liquidity squeeze and not expect an automatic government bailout.
In recent years, the amount and types of wealth management products issued by banks have grown quickly and become central to China’s risky shadow banking system. Wealth-management products bear much higher interest rates and are not reflected in bank balance sheets.
So far this year, although China’s overall credit growth has been quite strong, it has not translated into higher economic growth.
